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Havens, Jenkins, and Salvucci,
and the Defendant's "Right" to Testify
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
Three recent Supreme Court opinions that enlarge the scope of permissible im-
peachment may substantially influence the criminal defendant's decision whether
to take the stand. In this article, Professor Bradley evaluates the current status of
the defendant's "right" to testify, assesses the impact of these cases on that right,
and offers cogent advice on effective strategies for practitioners.
Last term, the Supreme Court decided two cases, United States v. Havens,1 and Jenkins v.
Anderson,2 that significantly expanded opportunities for impeaching criminal defendants who
choose to testify. Havens held that unlawfully seized and otherwise excluded evidence could
be used to impeach not only direct testimony but even statements first elicited from the defen-
dant during cross-examination. 3 Jenkins endorsed the use of pre-arrest silence prior to receipt
of Miranda warnings to impeach the defendant's testimony. 4 A third decision, United States
v. Salvucci,5 "broadly hinted,"'6 but did not expressly conclude, that the defendant's testimony
at a pretrial hearing on a suppression motion could be used to impeach subsequent testimony
at trial. 7 Consequently, defendants deciding whether to testify must evaluate several new
potentially adverse effects of taking the stand. This article considers the appropriateness of
placing those additional burdens upon the defendant's testimony. 8 In grappling with that
question, it is necessary first to determine the nature of the defendant's "right" to testify. The
conclusion reached here is that the criminal defendant has a due process right to testify as an
ordinary witness, but that it is frequently impossible to treat the defendant as "just another
witness." In those circumstances, the right to testify requires that impeachment of the defen-
dant must be limited. The middle sections of the article examine Havens, Jenkins, and Salvuc-
ci in detail, and evaluate the degree to which each impermissibly burdens the defendant's right
to testify. 9 These sections will argue that Havens improperly entrenches upon the defendant's
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington). A.B., 1967, Univer-
sity of North Carolina; J.D., 1970, University of Virginia Law School. The author is a former Assistant
United States Attorney from the District of Columbia. The author expresses appreciation to Professor
Lee Teitelbaum of Indiana University School of Law for his extremely helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this article.
1. 100 S. Ct. 1912 (1980).
2. 100 S. Ct. 2124 (1980).
3. The cross-examination questions must be reasonably suggested by the defendant's answers during
direct examination, however. 100 S. Ct. at 1917. Havens thus broadened the long-standing rule of Walder v.
United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), that allowed the use of illegally seized evidence to impeach the defendant's
direct testimony.
4. 100 S. Ct. at 2130. Jenkins thus limited the rationale of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), which held
that a defendant's silence after receipt of Miranda warnings could not be used to impeach his testimony.
5. 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980).
6. Id. at 2555 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
7. Id. at 2554 nn.8 & 9.
8. A full discussion of the impact of these three cases on defendants would treat two sets of rights. The
first set includes those rights that shape the options available to the defendant at trial - such as the defen-
dant's right, if any, to take the stand. The second set encompasses underlying rights that particularly affect
pretrial conduct: in Havens, the fourth amendment right to exclude evidence that was the product of an il-
legal seizure and in Jenkins, the fifth amendment right to remain silent in dealing with the police. This article
discusses only the first type, focusing upon the impact of the cases on the defendant's "right" to testify.
9. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly declared, an impermissible burdening of rights is not shown by
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right to testify, insofar as the decision permits use of suppressed evidence to supplement in-
directly the prosecution's case on the issue of guilt rather than to damage credibility. While the
evidentiary conclusions of Jenkins may be faulty, the rationale applied to Havens supports
limited use of pre-arrest silence to assail the credibility of a defendant. The correctness of
Salvucci 's ambiguous endorsement of impeachment by use of statements from a prior sup-
pression hearing depends upon the substantiality of the defendant's inconsistent assertions.
Such impeachment should be allowed if its primary impact is to correct false statements in the
defendant's direct testimony, but not if it serves primarily as a gratuitous supplement to the
prosecution's case-in-chief. The final portion of the article briefly treats the tactical problems
posed for defense counsel by these three cases.
1. THE "RIGHT" TO TESTIFY
The proposition that the defendant has a right to testify at trial may seem indisputable. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has frequently, if off-handedly, referred to such a right. In Harris v.
New York, 10 the Court stated that "[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his
own defense, or to refuse to do so. " I Similarly, in Brooks v. Tennessee, 12 the Court observed:
"Whether the defendant is to testify is an important tactical decision as well as a matter of con-
stitutional right." 13
No such right to testify, however, appears in the Bill of Rights. Indeed, as the Supreme
Court recognized in McGautha v. California,14 such a right certainly did not exist at the time
the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were framed. Rather, the accepted view at that time
was that the accused, as a party to the litigation, was disqualified from testifying because of
his interest in the outcome. 15 Not until 1827 was this rule authoritatively criticized, 16 and not
until 1859 did any state declare the testimonial competence of the criminal defendant to
testify. 17 Britain did not establish such a right for all criminal defendants until 1898,18 and only
in 1962 did Georgia become the last state to guarantee a right to testify as a matter of state law. 19
While no historic right to testify existed, this did not mean that the accused was given
a mere finding that a choice imposed upon the defendant may have a "discouraging effect on the the
defendant's assertion of his trial rights .... "Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 (1973). Rather, it is
necessary to consider the purpose of the rule in question, and to ascertain whether the benefits to society
at large outweigh the detriment to the individual defendant. See Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212,
218-22 & nn.8 & 9 (1978). The most common example of this type of balancing is the Court's approval of
laws that encourage the defendant to waive his right to a jury trial by pleading guilty. See id.
10. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
11. Id. at 225. See also Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (defendant has right to take
stand and "deny all the elements of the case against him .... ").
12. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
13. Id. at 612; cf. United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1978) (right to testify means to testify
truthfully; judge may base sentence in part upon his opinion of veracity of defendant's testimony).
14. 402 U.S. 183, 214 (1971).
15. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 576, 579 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 2 WIGMORE].
16. Jeremy Bentham spoke out against the rule in his Rationale of Judicial Evidence (1827). See 2
WIGMORE, supra note 15, at § 576.
17. In 1859, Maine passed legislation that made defendants competent witnesses in limited cases. 1859
Me. Acts ch. 104. Maine passed a general competency statute for criminal defendants in 1864. Ferguson
v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 (1961).
A federal statute declaring criminal defendants competent to testify became law in 1878. Act of Mar.
16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976)).
18. Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36. p.50. England established the right over "marked
opposition." Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 578, 579 n.9 (1961).
19. GA. CODE § 38-115 (1962).
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no opportunity to tell his side of the story. Rather, the practice was to permit him to make an
unsworn statement not elicited through direct examination by counsel but also not subject to
cross-examination. 20 In Ferguson v. Georgia,21 however, the Supreme Court declared this
practice an unconstitutional deprivation of due process insofar as it denied the accused "the
right to have his counsel question him to elicit his statement." 22
No clear declaration of a constitutional right to testify emerged from Ferguson, despite con-
curring opinions in which Justices Clark and Frankfurter urged such a ruling. 23 The majority
held only that the Georgia statute at issue was unconstitutional as written, 24 leaving open the
question of whether a statute hypothetically redrawn to allow unsworn statements elicited by
counsel while maintaining the incompetence of defendants to offer sworn testimony would be
constitutional. 25 Why the Court declined to reach the issue is unclear, but a footnote in the
opinion indicates that the petitioner's failure to assert such a constitutional right to testify may
have been a major factor. 26 Whatever the reason for the Court's limited focus, the reserved
issue became moot with respect to Georgia because Georgia enacted a testimonial competence
statute.
27
After Ferguson and the subsequent Georgia statutory revision, then, it had become a
federal constitutional right for the defendant to give a statement elicited by questions from
counsel, and a matter of federal28 and state statutory29 or state constitutional30 law that the
defendant was a competent witness in all American jurisdictions. In addition, Ferguson pro-
vided the foundation for subsequent assumptions that a constitutionally-guaranteed right to
testify may be read into the sixth and fourteenth amendments. 31
The sixth amendment rationale for such a right emerges only tacitly from Ferguson, as that
case focused upon the right to effective representation by counsel as an aspect of due process
under the fourteenth amendment. 32 The subsequent definitive application of the sixth amend-
ment to the states in Gideon v. Wainright,33 however, assured a constitutional basis other than
due process for a state defendant's right to effective representation. The eventual willingness
of the Court in Faretta v. California34 to equate the defendant's sixth amendment right to
20. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 15, at § 579.
21. 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
22. Id. at 596. Ferguson involved two provisions of the Georgia Code, §§ 38-415 and -416, both of
which had been upheld by Georgia courts. The majority of the Court specifically limited itself to a con-
sideration of § 38-415, the unsworn statement section. The incompetency statute, § 38-416, was not ad-
dressed because appellant raised no question as to its constitutional validity. Id.
23. Id. at 598, 601 (Clark & Frankfurter, JJ., concurring). The opinions urged the Court to hold the in-
competency provision unconstitutional.
24. Id. at 596.
25. Id. at 570 n. .
26. Id. (citing Brief for "Appellant" [sic] at 6-7). The majority also noted that adjudicating the validity
of the incompetency statute, § 38-416, "would be disrespectful of the state's procedures." Id.
Possibly the Court also felt that the declaration of a right to testify would interfere with the well-
established right of the prosecution to impeach the defendant with evidence of prior convictions if he
took the stand. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971).
27. See note 19 supra, and accompanying text.
28. See note 17 supra.
29. See generally Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. at 596-98 (list of statutes and state constitutional pro-
visions that establish the defendant's right to testify in all states).
30. See id.
31. See, United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 56& n.2 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (right to testify
has both statutory and constitutional bases).
32. See note 22 supra, and accompanying text.
33. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (state must provide counsel to indigent defendant in all criminal cases).
34. 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant on sixth amendment grounds could refuse representation by state-
appointed counsel if he preferred to represent himself).
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competent counsel with a right "to make his own defense" 35 in a state proceeding seemingly
leaves little room for doubt that the sixth amendment does incorporate a right to testify. 36
Likewise, the fourteenth amendment grounds for such a right are persuasive. A reading of
Ferguson together with an earlier case, In re Oliver, 37 suggests that the defendant's opportuni-
ty to take the stand may be characterized as a critical component of due process. In Oliver, the
Court set forth "the most basic ingredients of due process of law," 38 concluding that:
A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge against him, and an opportunity
to be heard in his defense - a right to his day in court - are basic in our system of
jurisprudence; and these rights include, as a minimum, a right to examine the
witnesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be represented by counsel. 3 9
Prior to Ferguson, the rights "to be heard in [one's own] defense" and "to offer testimony"
might have been thought to be vindicated by an unsworn statement. After Ferguson, it is clear
that the only way to preserve such rights is to afford the defendant the opportunity to testify
on his own behalf as a matter of due process. 4° This logical conclusion perhaps explains why
the Supreme Court has apparently taken such a right for granted in several cases decided since
Ferguson.4
1
Although the Court has recently assumed the existence of a right to testify, that right is
plainly a qualified one. The Court is adamant about such limitations as those expressed in
Brown v. United States:4 2 "If [the defendant in a criminal case] takes the stand and testifies in
his own defense, his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any
other witness, and the breadth of his waiver is determined by the scope of relevant cross-
examination." 43 A much earlier statement of similar principles notes that "it is clear that the
prosecution has a right to cross-examine [the defendant] ... with the same latitude as would
be exercised in the case of an ordinary witness .... "44 The evident import of these statements
35. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 819.
36. In United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978), Justice Stewart observed: "I cannot believe that
[the right to testify] is not also a constitutional right, for the right of a defendant under the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments 'to make his own defense' surely must encompass the right to testify in his own
behalf." Id. at 56 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)).
37. 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (petitioner convicted of contempt for false and evasive testimony without
notice, hearing, and counsel denied due process).
38. The passage from Oliver was so described by the Court in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18
(1967) (state statute prohibiting co-participants in crime from testifying for one another contravenes sixth
amendment right, applied to states via fourteenth amendment, to have compulsory process for obtaining
favorable witnesses).
39. 333 U.S. at 273 (emphasis added); accord, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n.5 (1975)
(defendant's constitutional right to defend himself violated when defendant forced to accept state-
appointed public defender); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 498 (1974) (petitioner, punished for contempt
without opportunity to speak, denied due process).
40. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. at 602 (Clark, J. concurring).
41. See, e.g., Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 219 n.8 (1978) (defendant may have right of con-
stitutional dimension to testify or remain silent); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972) (state rule
found to infringe upon defendant's rights of due process as defined in Ferguson); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971) (both majority ("Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own
def.:nse.") and dissent ("The choice of whether to testify in one's own defense ... is an exercise of the con-
stitutional privilege [against self-incrimination].") assumed right to testify; only scope of right was at
issue).
42. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
43. Id. at 154-55.
44. Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900).
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is that the defendant's rights to present testimony is a right to testify as an ordinary witness,45
no more and no less.46
Accordingly, the Court has held that the defendant who testifies may be impeached with
prior convictions, 47 prior inconsistent statements, 48 and any other relevant evidence that con-
tradicts his direct testimony49 - despite the potential of such attacks for discouraging him
from taking the stand at all.50 In seeking to ensure that the testifying defendant neither
benefits nor suffers from his position insofar as impeachment is concerned, however, the
court has failed to consider the essential impossibility of treating the defendant "like any other
witness" in certain circumstances discussed below.
While the "ordinary witness" principle may appropriately suggest some limitations on the
defendant's right to testify, 51 the Court too facilely concluded in Havens and Jenkins, and im-
plied in Salvucci, that because any other witness could be impeached by the evidence in ques-
tion, ipso facto the defendant also could be impeached. The peculiar position of the criminal
defendant requires a more penetrating analysis of cases that may critically erode his constitu-
tional right to testify by permitting impeachment that is more prejudicial than probative.
II. UNITED STA TES v. HA VENS
United States v. Havens52 is particularly illustrative of the problem. In that case,
respondents Havens and McLeroth were underemployed attorneys from Indiana who sought
to supplement their incomes by smuggling cocaine. Havens, the prime mover, traveled to Peru
four times in connection with this operation, accompanied on his first, third, and fourth trips
by McLeroth. 53 On the first trip, they taped cocaine to McLeroth's body and successfully
smuggled it into the United States. 54 On the third trip, no cocaine was procured in Peru, and
they returned empty-handed. 55 On the fourth trip the pair placed the cocaine in pockets that
had been sewn onto a T-shirt. 56 McLeroth then wore this garment under his regular clothing
on the flight back to the United States. Havens passed through customs without incident, but
McLeroth was searched and the cocaine was found. 57 Upon questioning, McLeroth im-
plicated Havens, who was located in the airport and arrested. Havens's luggage was seized and
searched without a warrant. Customs officials found no drugs but did find a T-shirt "from
which pieces had been cut that matched the pieces that had been sewn into McLeroth's
45. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. at 2127 ("When [the defendant] takes the stand on his own
behalf, he does so as any other witness, and within the limits of the appropriate rules, he may be cross-
examined.") (quoting Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 496-97 (1926)). See generally WIGMORE,
supra note 15, at § 890.
46. See note 45 supra. But see Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (defendant could not be im-
peached with post-arrest silence that followed Miranda warnings).
47. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971) (defendant who takes stand can be cross-
examined on matters arising from his testimony).
48. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (privilege to testify in one's own defense does not in-
clude right to commit perjury; even statements excluded from prosecution's case-in-chief can be used for
impeachment).
49. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (defendant cannot use exclusionary rule as shield to
protect against contradiction of untruths).
50. See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971) (requiring defendant to weigh costs and
benefits of taking the stand is not inconsistent with fair administration of criminal justice).
51. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215 (1971) (impeachment by prior convictions).
52. 100 S. Ct. 1912 (1980).
53. Appendix at 20, 23, 33, United States v. Havens, id.
54. Id. at 18.
55. Id. at 23. What Havens did on the second trip when he traveled alone is not known. Id. at 33.
56. Id. at 27-28.
57. Id. at 28.
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T-shirt." 58 The T-shirt and other material found during the illegal search were suppressed on
motion prior to trial. 59 At trial, 60 McLeroth testified that Havens had planned the
operation. 61 He described how the cocaine had been "taped" and "wrapped" around his body
during the first trip. 62 Regarding the fourth trip, he testified that Havens had supplied the
altered T-shirt and had sewn the cocaine into it.63 On direct examination, Havens denied that
he was guilty of any count of the indictment. 64 He offered an innocent explanation for his fre-
quent trips to Peru. 65 The following series of questions and answers then took place:
Q: [B]efore you returned to the United States, did you engage in purchasing co-
caine... ? [apparently referring to the fourth trip]
A: No....
Q: And you heard Mr. McLeroth testify earlier as to something to the effect
that this material was taped or draped around his body... ?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: Did you ever engage in that kind of activity with Mr. McLeroth... on that
fourth visit to Lima, Peru?
A: I did not. 66
On cross-examination, Havens testified as follows:
Q: Now, on direct examination, sir, you testified that on the fourth trip you
had absolutely nothing to do with the wrapping of any bandages or tee shirts or
anything involving Mr. McLeroth; is that correct?
A: I don't - I said I had nothing to do with any wrapping or bandages or
anything, yes. I had nothing to do with anything with McLeroth in connection
with this cocaine matter.
Q: And your testimony is that you had nothing to do with the sewing of the cot-
ton swatches to make pockets on that tee shirt?
A: Absolutely not.
Q: Sir, when you came through Customs, the Miami International Airport, on
October 2, 1977, did you have in your suitcase Size 38-40 medium tee shirts?
An objection to the last question was overruled and questioning continued:
Q: On that day, sir, did you have in your luggage a Size 38-40 medium man's
tee shirt with swatches of clothing missing from the tail of that tee shirt?
A: Not to my knowledge.
Q: Mr. Havens, I'm going to hand you what is Government's Exhibit 9 for
identification and ask you if this tee shirt was in your luggage on October 2nd,
1975?
A: Not to my knowledge. No. 67
58. United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. at 1914.
59. Id.
60. Both men were charged in a three-count indictment, but McLeroth pleaded guilty to one count and
testified against Havens. Id.
61. Appendix at 17-21, United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. 1912 (1980).
62. Id. at 18.
63. Id. at 21. McLeroth indicated that the body stocking and heavy-duty supporter which he wore over
the T-shirt had also been supplied by Havens. Id. at 27.
64. Id. at 30-31.
65. See id. at 31-32.
66. Id. at 33-34.
67. Id. at 35, 46. See also United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. at 1914.
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Havens was convicted of importing and possessing cocaine, but the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit reversed. 68 That court relied on Agnello v. United States69 and Walder v.
United States70 for the proposition that the Government could use illegally seized evidence at
trial only for the purpose of contradicting a particular statement made by the defendant on
direct examination. 7 1 Moreover, the court asserted that the defendant "must be free to deny
all the elements of the case against him without thereby giving leave to the Government to in-
troduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its
case-in-chief. '72 The Supreme Court reversed. 73 The majority conceded that Agnello pro-
hibited "smuggling in," during cross-examination, evidence that had been barred from the
Government's case-in-chief by the exclusionary rule. 74 In this case, however, the Court found
that the prosecutor's questions were properly rooted in the defendant's direct testimony. 75 Ac-
cordingly, the evidence had not been "smuggled in."76
After disposing of Agnello, the Court relied on Harris v. New York 77 and Oregon v. Hass78
for the proposition that the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is "sufficiently served
by denying its use to the government on its direct case." 79 Under that rationale, said the Court,
if the defendant lies during proper cross-examination, he may be impeached by suppressed
materials exactly as he might be impeached under Harris, Hass, and Walder for untruths
spoken during direct testimony. 8 0
Justice Brennan argued in dissent that the majority was untrue to Agnello in allowing
68. United States v. Havens, 592 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1979).
69. 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
70. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
71. United States v. Havens, 592 F.2d at 851 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)). Both
the court of appeals and the Supreme Court agreed that Havens's direct testimony did not frame with suf-
ficient specificity a statement that could thereupon be impeached by introduction of the T-shirt. Id. at
852; 100 S. Ct. at 1915. This conclusion is questionable. Havens's denial during his direct examination
that he had "taped anything on or draped anything around.. ." McLeroth's body might easily be read to
have "opened the door" to impeachment by any evidence indicating that Havens had in fact assisted in
"taping" or "draping" McLeroth -thereby avoiding the problematic issue of impeachment addressed to
matters raised during cross-examination. Nevertheless, the remainder of this article will assume, along
with the Court, that Havens had not "opened the door" on direct examination.
72. 592 F.2d at 851 (quoting Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. at 65).
73. United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. 1912, 1915 (1980).
74. Id. at 1915-16.
75. The majority opinion stated that the prosecutor could properly raise questions on cross-
examination that "would have been suggested to a reasonably competent cross-examiner" by the defen-
dant's direct testimony. 100 S. Ct. at 1916.
76. 100 S. Ct. at 1916. The distinction between Agnello and Havens is troublesome. In Agnello, the
evidence at issue was a can of cocaine illegally seized from the petitioner's bedroom. On direct examina-
tion, Agnello testified that he had received certain packages from one co-defendant for delivery to
another, but that he had not known that they contained cocaine or narcotics. On cross-examination, he
testified that he had never seen narcotics. The Government then introduced evidence of cocaine found in
his bedroom. 269 U.S. at 29-30. The defendant's statement on cross-examination led to the introduction
of narcotics found in his bedroom. Accordingly, the Court found that the evidence was "smuggled in."
Contrary to the Court's analysis, however, virtually the same type of cross-examination occurred in
Havens: a general denial on direct examination followed by a loosely related question on cross-
examination, the answer to which could be contradicted by the introduction of suppressed evidence.
77. 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971).
78. 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975).
79. United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. at 1916. The Court emphasized that only a "speculative
possibility" exists that the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule would be served by making un-
constitutionally obtained evidence unavailable to the Government for otherwise proper impeachment. Id.
See also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. at 225; Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. at 723.
80. United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. at 1916.
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impeachment regarding matters first used during cross-examination; such a rule placed an im-
permissible burden, he said, on the defendant's right to testify.81 In addition, he expressed
concern that the exclusionary rule was undermined by allowing any use of tainted evidence. 82
A preliminary analysis of the impact of the Havens ruling on the defendant's right to testify
would, as discussed above, focus upon whether Havens was treated like any other witness. At
first glance, it would appear that the respondent was so treated. He was subjected to cross-
examination that was suggested by his direct testimony; when he denied knowledge of possession
of the T-shirt, it was introduced into evidence along with testimony that it had been found in his
suitcase. 83 Certainly, any other witness would have been subjected to the same scrutiny.
Yet such an analysis overlooks the fundamental truth that the criminal defendant is not like,
and cannot be treated like, any other witness. The differences are many. Unlike other
witnesses, for example, the defendant cannot be compelled to testify and may not be excluded
from the courtroom pursuant to a rule on witnesses. 84 More importantly, he is the only
witness at the criminal trial with a direct personal stake in the outcome.
The decision whether to call any other witness to the stand is governed only by considera-
tion of the probative value and credibility of that witness's testimony.8 5 The defendant,
however, is forced to consider another factor. Even if he believes that his testimony will fur-
ther his case and that he can deal with cross-examination and impeachment, he may have to
forego testifying because evidence that is otherwise inadmissible might be used against him if
he takes the stand. To the extent that the defendant avoids testifying because the otherwise in-
admissible evidence implies his guilt -rather than because it is probative on the issue of his
credibility- the crucial decision whether to testify is made on the basis of factors wholly apart
from those which affect any other witness.
As every prosecutor is gleefully aware, evidence that addresses guilt as well as credibility,
such as suppressed material or prior convictions, is extremely useful in bolstering the Govern-
ment's case-in-chief-irrespective of its impeachment value, and notwithstanding an instruc-
tion to the jury to consider the evidence solely with regard to the defendant's credibility. 86
Havens exemplifies this strategy. Only slight damage to Havens's credibility flowed from the
introduction of the T-shirt to show that the defendant's recollection of the contents of a suit-
case was false. 87 Rather, the primary objective of the exercise was to admit the T-shirt so it
could be linked to other Government testimony bearing on the issue of guilt. 88 The nature of
the evidence rather than the purpose for which it is ostensibly offered determines its
significance for the defendant.
81. United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. at 1918 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 1914-15. Justice Brennan's first argument was joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall, and
Stevens; the second by Justice Marshall alone.
83. Id.
84. See Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 610-11 (1972) (rule that criminal defendant desiring to
testify must do so before any other defense testimony is presented violates defendant's privilege against
self-incrimination and denies him "guiding hand of counsel" guaranteed by due process).
85. The decision focuses upon such factors as the usefulness and relevancy of the testimony, the de-
meanor of the witness, and the extent to which the witness will stand up to cross-examination and im-
peachment.
86. Such an instruction was given in Havens. 100 S. Ct. at 1914-15. The Supreme Court has recognized
in past decisions, however, the ineffectiveness of instructions to disregard, stating that, "the risk that the
jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so vital to the
defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored." Bruton v.
United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (jury instruction not sufficient to cure prejudice to defendant of
admission of co-defendant's involuntary confession); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (same).
87. United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. at 1914.
88. This "more prejudicial than probative" effect was the very argument successfully made by the
Government in its battle in Walder for an exception to the Agnello rule. The Government pointed out in
its brief that in Agnello:
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Because other witnesses are much less vulnerable to damaging consequences from evidence
that by its nature serves dual purposes, the decision whether such a witness should testify is
unlikely to be colored by concerns other than probativity and credibility. If the defendant's
right to testify is to be qualified with the words "as an ordinary witness," his decision whether
to testify ought to be based, as far as possible, on those same concerns. He should be en-
couraged to testify if he can offer cogent evidence that will help his case. He should be
discouraged from testifying if he will become confused on cross-examination or if his credibili-
ty could be significantly impaired by impeachment evidence. But he may properly be dissuad-
ed from testifying because one result of his appearance on the stand would be the enhance-
ment of the prosecutor's case-in-chief with evidence that could not have been used but for his
decision to exercise his constitutional right.
The Supreme Court sought to prohibit precisely this vice in Agnello, 89 as Justice Brennan
observed in his dissent in Havens.90 In both cases, in fact, the crucial problem was not the
scope or the source of cross-examination questions, 9 1 but was the no-win choice forced upon
the defendant. The mere appearance of the defendant on the stand to offer the most minimal
testimony allowed the Government to engage in an impeachment exercise with the primary ef-
fect of permitting the use of incriminating evidence excluded from the prosecution's case-in-
chief. The sweeping but workable rule that illegally seized evidence "shall not be used at all" 92
was the virtue of the Agnello decision; the Court's subsequent retrenchment from that rule93
has propagated ad hoc and virtually untenable distinctions. 94 In Walder v. United States,95
the Court attempted to recast the defendant's Agnello right to testify without fear of admitting
excluded evidence to accomodate the countervailing right of the prosecution to impeach false
testimony. The defendant in that case denied during direct examination that he had ever
possessed narcotics. 96 The Government was then allowed to cross-examine him concerning
the suppressed evidence was so closely related in point of time to the offense charged that
there was a real danger that the suppressed evidence would be considered by the jury as proof
of guilt, [and] as of affirmative benefit to the Government. No such danger existed here, since
the suppressed evidence related to a point in time remote from the offenses charged... [and
therefore had its primary impact on credibility rather than guilt].
Brief for the United States in Opposition at 32-33, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), appear-
ing in Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor & Logic of the
Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1216 (1974). The argument was given considerably less
deference by the Court in Harris v. New York. See 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971).
89. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
90. 100 S. Ct. at 1918 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
91. Some support is present in Agnello for the claim that the Government's cross-examination was
beyond the scope of direct examination, or otherwise improper per se. See note 76 supra. Clearly,
however, proper cross-examination of one who denies knowing that he carried narcotics includes asking
whether he has seen narcotics before. See generally MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE §§ 21-22 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]. Likewise, in Havens, appropriate cross-examination of the
defendant's denial of any connection with the "wrapping or draping" of McLeroth included asking
whether he knew about the T-shirt from which wrapping material had been cut.
It has been suggested that Havens implicitly overruled Agnello to the extent that Havens permits the
admission of illegally obtained evidence to rebut a defendant's statements on a matter first raised during
cross-examination. Project, Tenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 69 GEO. L.J. 211, 307 (1980).
Arguably, Havens's direct testimony could itself have been impeached without further cross-examination.
See note 71 supra.
92. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 35 (1925).
93. The Havens majority concluded that the rule that illegally seized evidence "shall not be used at all"
was rejected by later cases. 100 S. Ct. at 1915.
94. 100 S. Ct. at 1918 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
96. Id. at 63.
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heroin unlawfully seized from his house two years earlier. 97 The Court held that the impeach-
ment was proper, noting implicitly that the defendant's statement on direct examination was col-
lateral to the elements of the particular case. 98 It further explained:
[T]he Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the ac-
cusation against him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against
him without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebut-
tal, evidence illegally secured by it and therefore not available for its case-in-chief.
Beyond that, however, there is hardly justification for letting the defendant affir-
matively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to
challenge his credibility. 99
Walder strikes a proper balance in implying that the prosecutor should have greater freedom
to impeach statements offered during direct examination than those elicted on cross-
examination. But the Court's declaration of a general right to deny all the elements of the offense
is inconsistent with the rationale that the defendant may not "affirmatively resort to perjurious
testimony" in any case where the defendant would perjure himself by denying one of the
elements of the offense. Suppose, for example, that a defendant charged with knowingly selling
heroin takes the stand to deny that he knew the substance sold to an undercover agent was actual-
ly heroin (i. e., generally denies an element of the prosecution's case, as Walder says he has a right
to do). The prosecution might wish to impeach that testimony with a confession improperly ob-
tained from the defendant at the time of arrest, yet would be barred from doing so by Walder.
Given Walder's holding that a similar statement regarding a collateral issue is impeachable, pro-
hibiting the impeachment of a perjurious statement that bears on an essential element of the case
makes little sense. In Harris v. New York, 100 on facts similar to those suggested above, the Court
concluded that the prosecutor could use illegally obtained evidence to impeach any reasonably
related assertion made by the defendant on direct examination. 101 Certainly Harris represented a
more satisfactory balancing of the rights to testify and impeach than did Waider. The primary
result of the impeachment in Harris was to expose the defendant's false testimony, whatever the
additional impact on the issue of guilt. Such a result was the goal of the Walder opinion as
well, 102 despite the confusing reference to a right to deny all the elements of an offense.
Havens, however, does not follow from Harris. The defendan-in Harris sought to use the ex-
clusionary rule as a sword, advancing false direct testimoKi-jertaining to a fundamental element
of the case. Havens, by contrast, sought only to be shielded by the exclusionary rule- an objec-
97. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. at 64.
98. Id. at 65.
99. Id.
100. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
101. Id. at 225. The defendant's statement in Harris had been taken by the police without proper Miranda
warnings. The majority found that the statement nevertheless could be used for impeachment. Id. Justice
Brennan argued in dissent that the consitutional privilege against self-incrimination "forbids the prosecu-
tion to use a tainted statement to impeach the accused." Id. at 230 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also
contended that Walder allowed only impeachment of a defendant's testimony concerning collateral mat-
ters, and not that concerning fundamental elements of the case against him. Id. at 227-28. The dissent did
not address the question of whether an untainted prior inconsistent statement could be used to impeach a
criminal defendant's denial of complicity in a crime.
102. The Harris Court viewed Walder as compatible with its ruling. Although Walder had involved im-
peachment on collateral matters, and Harris was impeached on a matter directly related to the offense
charged, the Court was "not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants a result different
from that reached by the Court in Walder." 401 U.S. at 225. The Havens Court reaffirmed that proposition.
100 S. Ct. at 1915.
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tive that Harris had implied was a matter of constitutional right. 103 Havens made no statement
during his direct testimony that could reasonably have been impeached by the suppressed
evidence. 1 04 Only when forced to testify about that evidence on cross-examination did he offer
an impeachable statement.
Under Agnello, the prosecutor cannot be permitted to introduce matters closely related to
suppressed evidence and then use that evidence to impeach the defendant's attempts to avoid the
subject. 105 Agnello and Harris read together, then, encourage the defendant both to exercise his
right to testify and to testify truthfully. To the extent that the defendant affirmatively resorts to
perjury he derogates the right to testify and is properly impeached. Under the rule adopted in
Havens, however, the defendant is discouraged from testifying at all because of fear bordering
on certainty that the prosecutor will be able to introduce otherwise excluded evidence strongly in-
dicative of guilt, irrespective of the content of the defendant's direct testimony. Not only is the
factfinding process thereby significantly impaired, but the defendant is forced to trade a con-
stitutional right to testify in exchange for a constitutional right to suppress illegally seized
evidence.
Havens is also distinguishable from Walder on the same theory. In Walder, the defendant at-
tempted to "turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession was seized
to his own advantage;"' 06 Havens, by contrast, was simply attempting to offer his side of the
story in direct testimony without affirmatively taking advantage of the exclusion of some
evidence from the case. 107 One might object that Havens's side of the story was a lie that ought to
be as impeachable as any other lie. 10 8 But that argument merely illustrates the underlying tension
between the exclusionary rule and the search for truth. The exclusionary rule always diminishes
the breadth of the search for truth by excluding relevant and frequently probative evidence of
guilt. 109 It is true that limiting the prosecutor's use of excluded evidence to direct impeachment
of plainly assailable statements would allow a defendant like Havens to "get away" with
misleading testimony, 110 but only to the degree that he has already benefited from the exclusion
of the evidence in the first place.
If the right to testify is to mean anything, it must contemplate that the defendant can take the
stand without fear that the exclusionary rule will be circumvented"1 1 by impeachment
103. The Court said in Harris: "The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use
perjury .... 401 U.S. at 226. See Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) ("It is one thing to say that
the Government cannot make an affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say
that the defendant can turn the illegal method by which evidence in the Government's possession was obtain-
ed to his own advantage, and provide himself with a shield against contradiction of his untruths.").
104. See text accompanying note 67 supra. But see note 91 supra.
105. Agnello held that the prosecutor may not bring up a subject related to excluded evidence unless the
defendant does so first. 269 U.S. at 29-30; see note 76 supra.
106. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. at 65. The Court noted that "the defendant went beyond a mere
denial of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged and made the sweeping claim that he had never
dealt in or possessed narcotics." Id. This perjurious testimony on direct examination opened the door for
the Government to attack his credibility by using the excluded evidence. Id.
107. Again the Court made this assumption in Havens. See note 71 supra, and accompanying text. An
argument could be made that this assumption was wrong - that Havens was impeachable as a result of his
misleading testimony on direct. But the decision in Havens is based upon a contrary assumption. Id.
108. Havens's "lie" on direct examination was that he had not aided McLeroth in concealing cocaine. 100
S. Ct. at 1914. The Government's discovery in Havens's bag of the T-shirt does not conclusively refute this
"lie," for McLeroth could have placed the T-shirt in the bag without Havens's knowledge. See id. (Havens
claimed that the T-shirt belonged to McLeroth).
109. See generally MCCoRMICK, supra note 91, at § 166 (2d ed. 1972) (discussion of policy basis for fourth
amendment exclusionary rule).
110. See Harris v.New York, 401 U.S. at 225 (defendant's privilege to testify on his own behalf does not
include privilege to commit perjury).
11l. With respect to the scope of the exclusionary rule, one could argue that any use of excluded
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evidence ostensibly directed toward credibility but effectively indicative of guilt. Accordingly, if
the prosecutor offers evidence for impeachment purposes that was excluded from the Govern-
ment's case-in-chief, the test of admissibilty should focus upon whether that evidence will tend,
as its primary effect, to prove guilt. If it so tends, it should be excluded as an impermissible
burden on the right to testify" 12 -regardless of the propriety of the cross-examination under
traditional evidentiary standards.
This proposed rule will enhance the search for truth, notwithstanding the necessity for barring
some evidence that might be admitted under Havens. Havens itself recognized truth as the "fun-
damental goal of our legal system;" 1 3 yet its holding, which discourages prospective witnesses
from offering testimony for reasons unrelated to its credibility, does not advance that goal. A
court that decides before trial to suppress evidence has already determined that the fourth
amendment requires that the search for truth be circumscribed. Once that decision is made, whit-
tling away at the protections imposed by the fourth amendment by placing burdens on the right
to testify is inappropriate. 114 The Havens ruling advances the search for truth only to the extent
that it admits otherwise excluded evidence having substantial probative value regarding the issue
of credibility, wholly apart from its implications respecting guilt. The exclusionary rule can be
validly overridden, then, only if the evidence in question primarily assails the credibility of the
defendant's direct testimony.
The Court engaged in just such an impact analysis in Grunewald v. United States, 115 where it
considered the ramifications of the rule that a defendant who testifies be treated "like any other
witness."'116 In Grunewald, the defendant had asserted his right to silence rather than testify
before a grand jury. At trial, the prosecutor sought to impeach the defendant's exculpatory
testimony with his seemingly inconsistent earlier silence.117 The Court disallowed that tactic,
reasoning:
[W]e may assume that under Raffel, [petitioner] in this case was subject to cross-
examination impeaching his credibility just like any other witness.... This does
evidence is barred regardless of its effect on guilt if the defendant does not "open the door" in direct
testimony. The Havens dissenters made essentially this argument. It is not based on the right to testify,
however. Under the latter right, the impact of the evidence on guilt is what places the defendant in a position
different from other witnesses. Consequently, for the purpose of the right to testify, two criteria must be
met for excluded evidence to be unavailable for impeachment. First, the defendant must not open the door
on direct examination, and second, the evidence must go primarily to the issue of guilt. In all other cases,
under the holding in Harris, excluded evidence should be available for impeachment purposes.
112. A limiting instruction to the jury is an insufficient safeguard in such cases. See Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton, the Court considered the case of the admission of the confession of
one co-defendant (Evans) which implicated both himself and the other co-defendant (Bruton). Since Evans
did not take the stand, the trial court instructed the jury that in determining Bruton's guilt or innocence they
should disregard Evans's confession as inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 125. The Court found any such instruc-
tions inadequate, however, when the constitutional right of cross-examination of one's accusers was
possibly being circumvented. Id. at 137. See also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring) (to suppose that a jury can consider evidence for one purpose but disregard it for
another is an "assumption that all practicing lawyers know to be an unmitigated fiction").
113. United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. at 1916.
114. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968). Simmons held that a defendant's testimony
in a suppression hearing was not admissible at trial to prove guilt. Id. To allow unfettered use of this
testimony at trial would inhibit the assertion of fourth amendment claims by raising the distinct possibility
that a waiver of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination would occur. Id. The Court found
it "intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another." Id.
115. 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
116. Id. at 420. This rule was first advanced in Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 496 (1926) (defen-
dant's refusal to take the stand to deny incriminating admission in first trial may be used to impeach
credibility of defendant at second trial).
117. Id.
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not, however, solve the question whether in the particular circumstances of this
case the cross-examination should have been excluded because its probative value
on the issue of [petitioner's] credibility was so negligible as to be far outweighed
by its possible impermissible impact on the jury."18
In Loper v.Beto 119 the Court utilized a similar analysis to invalidate another type of im-
peachment. In that case, prior uncounseled convictions were offered ostensibly to impeach the
defendant's credibility. A plurality of the Court considered it significant that the convictions
were not used "for the purpose of directly rebutting a specific false statement made from the
witness stand .... The previous convictions were used, rather, simply in an effort to convict
[petitioner] by blackening his character and thus damaging his general credibility in the eyes of
the jury."' 120 Neither the Loper plurality nor this article takes the position that the use of prior
convictions to impeach, alone, constitutes reversible error. 121 But Loper and Grunewald
plainly highlight the importance of carefully evaluating the impact of
118. Gruenwald v. United States, 353 U.S. at 420. The Court emphasized that the invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury, and subsequent response to the questions at
trial, were "wholly consistent with innocence." Id. at 421. Unlike in Havens, the impeachment in
Grunewald was impermissible as a matter of evidence. The inconsistencies asserted were insufficiently
probative to permit the evidence of silence to go to the jury. While typically such a decision is left to the
informed discretion of the trial court, the Court's finding of "grave Constitutional overtones" caused it to
exercise its supervisory powers to reverse. Id. at 423-24. See also United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171
(1975) (Court, exercising supervisory power, concluded that use of accused's silence during police inter-
rogation to impeach subsequent exculpatory statements at trial was intolerably prejudical).
119. 405 U.S. 473 (1972).
120. Id. at 482 n. I1 (footnotes omitted).
121. Loper's conviction was reversed only partially because prior convictions were used to prejudice the
jury with respect to Loper's character. The primary reason for the Court's action was that the prior con-
victions used by the prosecution were uncounseled convictions. Relying heavily upon Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court found that the use of such convictions was a violation of the
accused's due process rights. 405 U.S. at 483-84.
The use of prior convictions for impeachment does, however, raise the same issue presented by Havens:
when may material that is inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief be used for impeachment? The
answer suggested in this article, based upon Agnello, Walder, and Grunewald is: when the primary im-
pact of such material is on credibility rather than guilt. Absent a denial by the defendant of past
criminality, prior convictions are ostensibly used solely to impeach his general credibility. The jury is in-
structed not to consider the prior convictions with respect to guilt. Yet no less than in the case of excluded
evidence, prior convictions can cause the jury to believe that the defendant is guilty without regard to the
convictions' probative worth in assessing credibility. This is especially true when the prior conviction is
for a crime similar to the one at bar. McCormick summarizes the problem:
The sharpest and most prejudicial impact of the practice of impeachment by conviction
... is upon.., the accused in a criminal case who elects to take the stand. If the accused is
forced to admit that he has a 'record' of past convictions, particularly if the convictions are
for crimes similar to the one on trial, there is an obvious danger that the jury, despite in-
structions, will give more heed to the past convictions as evidence that the accused is the
kind of man who would commit the crime on charge.., than they will to the legitimate
bearing of the past convictions on credibility.
MCCORMICK, supra note 91, at § 43 (emphasis added), quoted with approval in Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. at
482 n. 11; see also McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants by Prior Convictions, 1970 Aiuz. ST.
L.J. 1; Schaefer, Police Interrogation and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 61 Nw. U.L. Rav.
506, 512 (1966).
If the defendant is on trial for rape, it may be persuasively argued that the impact of his prior robbery
conviction upon the issue of his credibility outweighs the impact on the question of guilt. But when he is
on trial for robbery, that prior conviction stands like a beacon, lighting the road for a guilty verdict. Con-
sequently, the defendant, whether guilty or innocent, will almost certainly not testify if he has a prior con-
viction for a similar crime. See, e.g., Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It,
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impeachment evidence on the issue of guilt. The claim that the jury can consider certain evidence
only for the purpose for which it is offered, while ignoring other permissible but irresistible im-
plications, defies human nature. 122
This careful evaluation of impact is in keeping with the principle that the defendant be treated
like any other witness insofar as possible. Suppose a defense witness, X, testifies that the defen-
dant, Y, was with him in Cleveland on the night that the robbery with which Y is charged
occurred in Toledo. Suppose further that the prosecutor has a witness who saw Xand Ytogether
in Toledo that night. Obviously, impeachment 123 of X's alibi testimony will inevitably generate
serious questions about the defendant's guilt as well as about X's credibility. Because the
primary effect of the prosecution witness's testimony will be to impeach credibility, however, the
testimony is properly used against either X or Y. In such circumstances, the search for truth
legitimately overrides any incidental infringement of exclusionary principles. 124
78 MICH. L. REv. 204, 208 (1979); H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERIcAN JuRY 146, 160-69 (1966)
(defendants without a criminal record elect to testify 37% more often than do defendants with a record of
past convictions). A rule that discourages the defendant from fully and honestly presenting his side of the
case derogates the essential rationale of the fact finding process and consequently derogates the defen-
dant's right to testify. See generally Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In Luck, the
court was faced with a District of Columbia statute which stated that a witness's prior conviction "may be
given in evidence to affect [his] credibility." Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-241, ch. 3, § 14-305, 77
Stat. 519 (current version at D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1973)). The court construed the language to mean
that trial courts were not required to allow impeachment by convictions, but were only required to use
sound judicial judgment in making such a determination. Id. at 768. The Luck doctrine was subsequently
refined in Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968).
Gordon enumerated several factors to help the court in making its determination concerning the propriety
of a conviction: (1) the nature of the conviction, (2) its remoteness in time, (3) its similarity to the crime
charged, (4) the need for the defendant's testimony, and (5) the importance of the credibility issue. Id. at
940-41. In large part, this doctrine required the trial court to determine whether the probative value of the
evidence outweighs the prejudical risk resulting.
The Luck doctrine later became the basis for rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. For a discus-
sion of the evidentiary strain between safeguarding the innocent and ensuring punishment of the guilty,
see Curran, Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a), 49 TEMp. L.Q. 890 (1976); Nichol, Prior Crime Impeach-
ment of Criminal Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 482 W. VA. L. REv. 391 (1980);
Spector, Impeachment Through Past Convictions: A Time for Reform; 18 DEPAuL L. REv. 1 (1969);
Note, Other Crimes Evidence at Trial: Of Balancing and Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 778 (1961).
Assuming that prior convictions are relevant to the question of credibility, it does not seem fair to the
prosecution to allow the defendant in an armed robbery case to be impeached with a prior burglary con-
viction but not with a prior armed robbery conviction. The best way to escape this difficulty is to permit
the prosecutor to ask, as to all prior convictions, "Isn't it true that in 1977 you were convicted of a felony
in (the state in question)?" This form of question, if applied in all cases, would allow the prosecution to
impeach the defendant's credibility without adding the additional stigma of branding the defendant as a
rapist or murderer (crimes that are more inflammatory and less relevant to his credibility than a crime in-
volving dishonesty, such as embezzlement).
122. One survey revealed that 98% of attorneys questioned believed that it was impossible for a limiting
instruction on impeachment testimony to be effective. Note, To Take the Stand or Not to Take the Stand:
The Dilemma of the Defendant With a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 215 (1968). See
'also Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744 (1959) (limiting instruction on
this issue serves merely to sensitize jury to evidence in question); see note 112 supra, and accompanying
text.
123. For purposes of clarity, this hypothetical ignores the substantial likelihood that the prosecution
witness's testimony could be presented as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief.
124. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (testimony inadmissible in prosecution's case-in-
chief admissible for impeachment of defendant's direct testimony because arriving at truth is a fundamen-
tal goal of legal system); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) (impeachment a valuable aid to
elicitation of truth justifying use of illegally seized evidence; police sufficiently deterred by other
measures from violating exclusionary rule.
[Vol. 18:419
DEFENDANT'S "RIGHT" TO TESTIFY
In summary then, it is only when the prosecution seeks to use evidence relevant to the issue
of guilt but barred from the prosecution's case-in-chief either because of prejudice, as in the
case of prior convictions, 125 or because of the exclusionary rule, as in Havens, that the tension
between exclusionary principles and the search for truth becomes evident. If the prosecution
seeks to impeach the defendant with material barred from its case-in-chief, the due process
right to testify requires the prosecution to demonstrate that the primary effect of such im-
peachment will be to damage credibility, not to supplement the prosecution's case on the issue
of guilt with otherwise inadmissible evidence. 126 Any less stringent rule may impermissibly
burden the defendant's constitutional right to take the stand. 127 When the ostensible search
for truth becomes merely a vehicle for circumventing the proper functioning of the exclu-
sionary rule-that is, when the primary impact of impeachment is to inculpate the defen-
dant - then it is an exaltation of form over substance to allow that "impeachment" to proceed.
III. JENKINS v. ANDERSON
In Jenkins v. Anderson,128 the petitioner stabbed and killed a man named Redding in
Detroit, Michigan. He was not immediately apprehended, but eventually turned himself in to
the authorities. 129 At trial, petitioner testified that he had stabbed Redding in self-defense
after Redding had attacked him with a knife. 130
On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned petitioner about his actions after the stab-
bing. Petitioner admitted that he had not waited for the police to tell them what had happen-
ed, and that he did not turn himself in until approximately two weeks after the incident. 131
During the closing argument, the prosecutor observed that the defendant had "waited two
weeks... before he did anything about surrendering himself," and claimed that the defendant
had used the time to "line up" defense witnesses. 132
Petitioner subsequently was convicted of manslaughter. 33 His appeal, federal habeas cor-
pus petition, and federal appeal were all unsuccessful. 134 The Supreme Court granted
125. See note 123 supra.
126. The use of suppressed evidence to impeach plainly would be permissible where the defendant's
credibility rather than his guilt was the focus of the evidence. If Havens had testified during cross-
examination that he had never traveled to Peru prior to the trip in question, for example, the prosecution
properly could have introduced an itinerary detailing Havens's earlier trips, although the document had
been illegally seized from his suitcase, because such evidence would have no particular bearing on the
question of guilt.
127. See United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. at 1919 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (defendant relinquishes
right to testify for right to avoid illegal conviction; "one constitutional privilege purchased at the ex-
pense of another"); cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 394 (Court found it "intolerable" that
constitutional right under fifth amendment should have to be surrendered in order to assert constitu-
tional right under fourth amendment). But cf. Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978) (New
Jersey sentencing scheme requiring choice of pleas not violative of constitutional rights; not every
burden on exercise of those rights invalid);McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. at 213 (in companion case,
Ohio procedure allowing jury determination of guilt and punishment in single trial does not unconstitu-
tionally compel self-incrimination; Constitution does not forbid requiring defendant to choose among
difficult alternatives).
128. Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. 2124 (1980).
129. Id. at 2126. Petitioner testified that he had decided to turn himself in after talking to Coleman
Young (the mayor of Detroit). Appendix at 37, Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. 2124 (1980).
130. 100 S. Ct. at 2126.
131. Id.
132. Appendix at 43, Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. 2124 (1980).
133. Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. at 2127.
134. Id.
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certiorari1 35 but ultimately affirmed the conviction. 136
The Court, relying on Raffel v. United States,137 based its decision on the principle
previously discussed in this article: once the defendant chooses to testify, he may be cross-
examined like any other witness. 138 In this regard, the Court found that "common law tradi-
tionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by their previous failure to state a fact in cir-
cumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted. ' 139 Petitioner's failure to
turn himself in to the police could be equated to a failure to state a fact; accordingly, the peti-
tioner's story could properly be impeached by evidence of his inaction. 14
0
The issue regarding the defendant's right to testify14' is whether the petitioner was properly
treated like any other witness when he took the stand. 142 The answer, given the Court's analysis
of the evidentiary law noted above, is yes. Any witness can be properly impeached by silence
under appropriate circumstances 1 43 If a witness standing at the scene of a crime is questioned
by the police but does not reply, his subsequent testimony that the defendant acted in self-
defense surely could be impeached by that silence. Similarly, in Jenkins, assuming as did the
Court that petitioner's silence was probative, 14 4 impeaching petitioner with that silence was
perfectly/permissible provided that the impact of that exercise on credibility was more substan-
tial than the impact on guilt. 145 The latter condition appears to have been fulfilled, for proof of
the elements of the prosecution's case-in-chief-that the defendant stabbed the victim, for ex-
ample, or that the act was unprovoked -was not significantly advanced by evidence of peti-
tioner's post facto silence. While such a silence prior to arrest might be viewed by the jury as
evidence of a guilty conscience, the impeachment value of the defendant's original failure to
assert self-defense plainly outweighs that speculative prejudicial effect. 146 Only if pre-arrest
silence is not probative of a defendant's credibility, and prejudice to the defendant might result,
should it be barred from use for impeachment. 147 The problem with Jenkins is not its treatment
of the defendant's right to testify,! rather it is the Court's preliminary evidentiary conclusion
that petitioner, by delaying his surrender to the police, had "fail[ed] to state a fact
135. 100 S. Ct. 45 (1979).
136. Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. at 2127.
137. 271 U.S. 494, 497 (1926) (defendant taking the stand in own behalf may be cross-examined for pur-
pose of impeaching credibility; refusal to testify in first trial may be commented upon during second
trial).
138. Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. at 2127-28.
139. Id. at 2129.
140. See generally 3A J.WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042. (Chadbourne rev. ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as 3A
WIGMORE]
141. The defendant's right to testify is the only aspect of the case discussed here. Note, however, that
the Court tacitly admitted that petitioner's inaction was an exercise of his underlying constitutional right
to silence, but concluded that impeachment with that silence did not violate the fifth or fourteenth
amendments. 100 S. Ct. at 2128-29. The majority felt that any chilling effect that such impeachment
might place upon the original exercise of the right to silence was permissible. Id. at 2128-29.
Justice Stevens, concurring in the result, felt that the Court's fifth amendment analysis was inap-
propriate where, as here, the defendant had not asserted the privilege at all but had simply failed to pre-
sent himself to the police for questioning. Id. at 2130.
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented, arguing that impeachment by pre-arrest silence
placed "an impermissible burden on the exercise of the privilege [against self-incrimination] ." Id. at 2135.
142. See text accompanying notes 10 through 51, supra.
143. See 3A WIGMORE, supra note 140, at § 1042.
144. But see text accompanying notes 149 through 158 infra.
145. See notes 126 through 127 supra, and accompanying text.
146. Furthermore, the inescapable embarrassment to the accused from an assertion of the right to
silence has long been considered unavoidable, as the Jenkins Court recognized. 100 S. Ct. at 2128.
147. Id. at 2129. See generally United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1975); Stewart v. United
States, 366 U.S. 1, 5 (1961); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 424 (1957).
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in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have been asserted." 148 As Justice Mar-
shall pointed out in his dissenting opinion, "the authority cited by the majority 149 ... makes it
clear that the [impeachment by silence] rule cannot be invoked unless the facts affirmatively
show that the witness Was called on to speak .... ,,150 Indeed, it is hard to see why an in-
dividual's reluctance to hand himself over to the police and admit a stabbing, in self-defense or
otherwise, is the kind of "silence" that the evidentiary rule was designed to cover. 15 1 Anyone
who believes that volunteering information to police is "natural" 152 for a resident of Detroit's
inner-city has an unusually optimistic view of human nature.
This evidentiary ambiguity inheres in any assertion of silence by a criminal suspect. If a
suspect is read his Miranda warnings and chooses to remain silent, the Court has recognized,
in Doyle v. Ohio,15 3 that this silence is "insolubly ambiguous" and hence may not be used for
impeachment. 154 And what of the defendant who due to police error does not receive Miranda
warnings but nevertheless refuses to respond to accusations by the police? No "fair play"
problem exists such as that in Doyle because the police have not told him he does not have to
talk.155 Yet no one can say whether such a defendant was silent because he was aware of his
rights or because he was tacitly admitting the accusation. It simply makes no sense to argue
that it is "natural" to speak in circumstances where one has a right to do otherwise.
The Court's response to this problematic issue was to term it a matter of state evidentiary
law not cognizable under due process, and thereby avoid discussing a difficult question.156 It
does not seem appropriate, however, to allow the scope of constitutional rights to depend
upon whether the protected person is informed of those rights by the police. Consequently, it
is difficult to reconcile Jenkins with Doyle; the absence of any notice of a right to silence in
Jenkins is the sole ground on which the Court distinguished the cases.
In any event, the very ambiguity of Jenkins's inaction made its impeachment value negli-
gible. 157 In fact, it appears that the prosecutor never formally "impeached" Jenkins's testimony,
148. Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. at 2129.
149. WIGMORE, supra note 140, at § 1042.
150. Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. at 2135 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151. The "common classes of cases" where impeachment by silence is appropriate are:
(1) Omissions in legal proceedings to assert what would naturally have been asserted under
the cirumstances. (2) Omissions to assert anything, or to speak with such detail or
positiveness, when formerly narrating on the stand or elsewhere the matter now dealt with.
(3) Failure to take the stand at all, when it would have been natural to do so.
3A WIOMORE, supra note 140, at § 1042.
152. "[T]he underlying test is, would it have been natural for the person to make the assertion in ques-
tion." Id. at § 1042.
153. 426 U.S. 610, 617. Doyle, however, was not based upon a view rejecting the evidentiary value of
silence but was attributable to concern about the "fundamental unfairness" of advising someone of a right
to silence and then using it against him. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. at 2130.
154. Doyle, by remaining silent, may have been exercising his fifth amendment rights or may have been
tacitly admitting the crime-the answer is unclear. Jenkins's silence was similarly "insolubly ambiguous."
He may have been admitting guilt by avoiding the police or he may simply have preferred not to undergo
the difficulties of attempting to exculpate himself.
155. The affirmative violation of the rights of such a defendant would be unlikely to move the Court
even though Doyle was decided on facts not indicating such a violation. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975) (statements obtained in violation of Miranda allowed to be used for impeachment); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (same).
156. Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. at 2129.
157. Had Jenkins been aggressively confronted with that "silence," he could quite credibly have
responded, for example, that he simply didn't want to get involved with the police if he could possibly
avoid doing so.
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but instead simply claimed that Jenkins used the two-week delay to collect witnesses favorable
to the defense58- a strategy that underscores the insoluble ambiguity of Jenkins's silence even
for the prosecutor.
IV. UNITED STA TES v. SAL VUCCI
In United States v. Salvucci, 159 the Court obliquely touched upon the issue of defendant's
right to testify in its consideration of another related issue: "automatic standing." The
automatic standing rule established in Jones v. United States 16 0 allowed criminal defendants
charged with possessing contraband that had been seized by the police in violation of the
fourth amendment to move to suppress the contraband without asserting a possessory or
privacy interest in the property seized or the premises searched. 16 1 Prior to Jones, the defen-
dant wishing to suppress evidence had been required to claim a possessory or privacy interest
in that evidence; the claim could then be used against the defendant at trial. 162
The question presented in Salvucci was whether the automatic standing rule should be aban-
doned. 163 The Court concluded that it should be, 164 finding the justification for the rule ad-
vanced in Jones165 no longer compelling. Two factors primarily accounted for the Court's
finding. First, Simmons v. United States, 166 decided subsequently to Jones, had held that
testimony offered by the defendant in support of his motion to suppress could not be used in
the prosecution's case-in-chief. 167 In consequence, defendants could more readily challenge il-
legal seizures with less risk of total self-incrimination. Second, a requirement of possessory in-
terest seemed more workable now than before. The Court observed: "[djevelopments in the
principles of standing ... clarify that a prosecutor may, with legal consistency and legitimacy,
assert that a defendant charged with possession of a seized item did not have a privacy interest
violated in the course of the search and seizure." 168
158. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
159. 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980). Salvucci involved a charge of possession of stolen mail in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1708 (1976). The mail had been seized during a search of the apartment of the mother of one of
the respondents. Respondents prevailed on a motion to suppress without making any showing of standing
to protest the search, relying on the "automatic standing" rule of Jones. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the suppression order in United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir. 1979). 100 S. Ct. at 2549-50.
160. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
161. Id. at 264.
162. Id. at 260. The assertion of a possessory or privacy interest at a suppression hearing could be in-
troduced into evidence as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief, at the time Jones was decided. See notes
165 through 168 infra, and accompanying text.
163. See note 159 supra.
164. United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. at 2551.
165. The Jones Court had expressed two related concerns in establishing the automatic standing rule.
First, the possessory interest requirement as it existed prior to Jones forced the defendant to choose either to
challenge an illegal seizure, risking self-incrimination in the process, or simply to forego assertion of his
fourth amendment claim. The Court found that requiring such a choice between constitutional rights was
impermissible. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,262-63 (1960). Second, the Court noted that the stand-
ing requirement allowed the Government unfairly to benefit from contradictory assertions at trial. This was
so because the Government would argue that the defendant hadpossessed contraband in attempting to con-
vict him on the merits, while it would contend that the defendant had not shown a sufficient possessory in-
terest in the contraband, in attempting to evade the exclusionary rule. The Court found that such an incon-
sistent position on the part of the prosecution belied the fair administration of criminal justice. Id.
166. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
167. See id.
168. United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. at 2551. This point countered the rationale of Jones as
characterized by the Salvucci Court that "the government ought not to be allowed to assert that the defen-
dant possessed [contraband] for the purposes of criminal liability, while simultaneously asserting that he
did not possess [it] for the purposes of claiming the protections of the Fourth Amendment." Id.
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Given the holding in Salvucci, that defendants wishing to suppress illegally seized evidence
must once again assert a privacy or possessory interest in the evidence, 169 the question of
whether the defendant's testimony at the motion hearing may be used to impeach him at
trial 170 is of critical significance in its effect on the scope of the defendant's right to testify. 171
The Court recognized the question, but expressly declined to resolve it. 172 Some language in
the Court's opinion, however, "broadly hints"1 73 that suppression hearing testimony would be
properly used for impeachment. 174 Because a more definitive statement endorsing that view
may, as argued by the dissent, 175 be imminent in light of Havens and Jenkins, it is appropriate
to discuss the issue here.
To put the matter in more concrete form, a typical case would involve a defendant who, in
order to establish standing for his motion to suppress, admits at the hearing that a stitcase
containing heroin and found in the trunk of a friend's car was his. Suppose the motion is
denied because the search was lawful, and the defendant is charged with possession of the
heroin found in the suitcase and brought to trial. At trial he claims that he has never before
seen the suitcase. Can the prosecution impeach the defendant by using his statement from the
suppression hearing?
At first blush, this is a classic case of impeaching a witness with his prior inconsistent
statements.176 Any other witness who testified inconsistently at a prior judicial proceeding
could be so impeached. Therefore, the defendant could be also.
In two important ways, however, the defendant's position is different from that of the or-
dinary witness. First, no other witness is obliged to defend his constitutional rights at a hearing
on a motion to suppress. Other witnesses might have testified there, but not in pursuit of any
constitutional right. This first issue is simply a function of the scope of Simmons, as the Court
recognized in Salvucci. 177 The question is, to what extent does an impeachment exercise that
takes special advantage of a defendant's decision to assert a constitutional right but later
testify inconsistently with that assertion thereby impair the original exercise of the right? Sim-
mons held that testimony could not be used by the prosecution "on the issue of guilt." 178 But
can it be used on the issue of credibility? Simmons was based upon the underlying fourth and
fifth amendment rights. Whether or not those rights are unduly burdened by impeachment
with suppression hearing testimony can only be determined by an analysis that is beyond the
scope of this article.
169. United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. at 2553-54.
170. This issue is not unique to the Salvucci holding. Salvucci abolished the automatic standing rule for
possessory offenses. But in non-possessory offense cases, the defendant has always been required to
assert a possessory interest at any hearing on a motion to suppress. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223,
229 (1973); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960). As the Court noted in Salvucci, several state
courts have held that testimony offered at such a motion hearing could be used to impeach the
defendant's testimony at trial. 100 S. Ct. at 2554 n.8.
171. As indicated at the beginning of this article, any impeachment question like the one posited here
involves two different kinds of rights: the right to testify and the underlying constitutional rights that per-
tain, for example, to the suppression of evidence.
172. 100 S. Ct. at 2554. "That issue ... is not resolved here, for it is an issue which more aptly relates to
the proper breadth of the Simmons privilege, and not to the need for retaining automatic standing." Id.
173. The phrase is from Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion, id. at 2555.
174. Id. The Court noted that it had held that "the protective shield of Simmons is not to be converted
into a license for false representations .... United States v. Kahan, 415 U.S. 239, 243." Id. at n.9.
175. Id. at 2555.
176. MCCORMICK, supra note 91, at §§ 34-36.
177. 100 S. Ct. at 2554. See note 172 supra, and accompanying text.
178. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
179. For a discussion of this issue, see Justice Marshall's dissent in Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. at 2555. Sim-
mons held that "[i]t seems obvious that a defendant who knows that his testimony may be admissible
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The second difference between the defendant and other witnesses is more pertinent to the
present inquiry. It is the duality of purposes that impeachment may advance when the defendant
is on the stand, as opposed to the unitary emphasis on credibility that pervades the impeachment
of other witnesses. In the foregoing example, the suppression hearing evidence used to impeach
the defendant is offered to challenge credibility, but also implies guilt. The example is like
Havens, in that the exclusion of evidence probative of guilt from the prosecution's case-in-chief
in both cases is circumvented through the device of impeachment.
But this example is unlike Havens in that the defendant in the latter case was led by cross-
examination into a discussion inviting false assertions, which were then impeached by evidence
primarily bearing upon guilt. 180 In the suppression testimony hypothetical, by contrast, the
defendant has lied about a major issue in his testimony on direct examination. The search for
truth requires that these false statements be subject to challenge. Consequently, for reasons
discussed more fully in part II of this article, impeachment of the defendant in that case would
not impermissibly burden his right to testify.
The permissibility of impeachment in such a case is, however, subject to the same qualifica-
tions respecting impact that were developed above. If the impeachable testimony is such that
the primary effect of the impeachment exercise would be to allow the prosecutor to present
otherwise suppressed evidence to bolster the Government's case on the issue of guilt, then the
proposed impeachment should be barred. Otherwise, the defendant is forced to trade one con-
stitutional right for another, a bargain expressly prohibited by Simmons. 18 1
V. CONCLUSION
The three cases discussed above have rendered the job of the criminal defense attorney more
difficult. The familiar admonition to the client to say nothing to the police must be tempered
by the realization that refusal to speak might be used against the defendant at trial, if prior to
Miranda warnings. It is likely, however, that the client can credibly rebut any inference of
guilt that the jury might draw from his silence by simply pointing out that "I didn't say
anything because my attorney told me not to" or that "I said nothing because I was aware of
my right to silence." Moreover, pre-arrest silence will normally be so ambiguous that it is
unlikely that the prosecutor will be able to capitalize on it.
More troublesome is the attorney's decision whether to file a motion to suppress, which
after Salvucci may require assertion of a possessory interest by his client. If he plans to put his
client on the stand at trial, he may wish to forego the motion. If he loses the motion, the
against him at trial will sometimes be deterred from presenting the testimonial proof of standing
necessary to assert a Fourth Amendment claim." Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 392-93. The
deterrent effect on a defendant's fourth amendment rights in such a case, however, is analogous to the
deterrent effect on the exercise of fifth amendment rights of Jenkins, where the Court assumed that fifth
amendment rights had been asserted but nevertheless allowed the pre-arrest silence to be used for im-
peachment purposes. Jenkins v. Anderson, 100 S. Ct. at 2129. Therefore, it seems likely that the "chilling
effect" rationale of Simmons would not be extended to exclude a defendant's testimony at a suppresion
hearing from the prosecution's impeachment arsenal.
180. See text accompanying notes 52 through 127 supra.
181. "[W]e find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to
assert another." 390 U.S. at 394.
The difference between the position taken in this article, based on the right to testify, and the position
of Justice Marshall's dissent in Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. at 2555 (Marshall, J. dissenting), based upon the
scope of Simmons and the exclusionary rule, is significant. In Justice Marshall's view, which this article
does not address, the defendant's testimony from the motion to suppress should not be used to impeach
under any circumstances. See United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. at 2555-56 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
This article contends that such testimony should be usable for impeachment unless its impact on the issue
of guilt outweighs its impact on the defendant's credibility.
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Government will use the challenged evidence in its case-in-chief and impeach the defendant
with his motion testimony. If he wins the motion and the trial goes forward anyway, his client
is likely to be impeached with both suppressed material and motion testimony, even if the at-
torney is careful to avoid bringing the matter up on direct examination. Thus, it may be wise
for the attorney not to file a suppression motion as a matter of course, but to do so only when
he believes, first, that the motion has a reasonable chance of success, and second, that the case
will likely be dismissed if the motion to dismiss is granted.
At trial, in deciding whether the client will testify, the attorney will be faced not only with the
familiar reasons for keeping a client off the stand (poor witness, prior convictions, etc.) but also
with the additional possibilities of impeachment with pre-arrest silence or with critically damag-
ing evidence. In addition, it appears likely that the Supreme Court will soon allow impeachment
that admits the defendant's testimony from the motion to suppress hearing.
The curious result of these holdings is that the defendant who has been subjected to an il-
legal search and has prevailed on the motion to supress will almost certainly not take the stand
at trial. Other defendants will face a difficult choice, balancing the value of their potential
testimony against the harm that impeachment evidence might do in damaging credibility or
implying culpability. One hopes, however, that the Court will eventually recognize that when
the primary impact of "impeachment" evidence is to strengthen the prosecution's case respec-
ting the issue of guilt, the impeachment should not be allowed.

